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ABSTRACT: This article explores the notions of indeterminacy and creation in Castoriadis’ 
work. The notions of indeterminacy and creation are examined in the light of Castoriadis’ 
conception of Being as Chaos, which derives from his Logic of magmas that contradicts what 
Castoriadis defines as “ensemblistic-identitary Logic”. The conception of Being as Chaos is 
connected with the notion of otherness, conceived as creation ex nihilo. Specifically, creation ex 
nihilo is analyzed in the context of Castoriadis division of Being’s multiplicity into difference and 
otherness. I will argue that Being’s difference refers to the “ensemblistic-identitary Logic”, while 
otherness comes up with a novel form of Being, identified as creation ex nihilo. Finally, otherness is 
considered in terms of Castoriadis’ conception of time, by which otherness and, by extension, 
time itself, is associated with Castoriadis’ notion of imaginary, as the latter unfolds in the social-
historical field of mankind through the imaginary significations of society. 




BEING AND CHAOS 
The concepts of indeterminacy and creation constitute the basic characteristics of 
Castoriadis’ Logic of magmas, which develops in contrast to the determinacy principle 
that rules “ensemblistic-identitary Logic”. “Ensemblistic-identitary Logic” or, for 
brevity, ensidic Logic is a neologism of Castoriadis referring to a pattern of 
theorization that originates in Aristotle’s Typical Logic, and is systematized by 
mathematics set theory, introduced by Cantor in 1894. In simple terms, set theory 
consists in the attempt to attribute determinate properties to determinate ensembles of 
elements or objects through the principles of Typical Logic. In contrast to this pattern 
of theorization, Castoriadis develops his Logic of magmas in order to surpass the 
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ensidic Logic. I must mention though that a thorough analysis of both ensidic Logic 
and Castoriadis’ Logic of magmas is impossible in the contexts of this article. Suffice it 
to note that in Castoriadis’ ontology Being is not a set or system of sets, as considered 
by set theory, but a magma, whose basic characteristics are indeterminacy and 
creation. 
What is is not set or system of sets. What is is not fully determined. What is is 
Chaos, or Abyss, or Groundlessness. What is is Chaos with non-regular 
stratification. What is bears with it [comporte] an ensemblistic-identitary dimension 
‒ or an ensemblistic-identitary part everywhere dense (…). The non-
determination of what is is not mere ‘indetermination’ in the private and 
ultimately trivial sense. It is creation, namely, emergence of other determinations, 
new laws, new domains of lawfulness1. 
The concepts of indeterminacy and creation in the thought of Castoriadis echo the 
concepts of infinity and chaos in Anaximander and Isiodos respectively. Indeed, the 
way Castoriadis reads the abovementioned writers in his work Ce qui fait la Grece2 comes 
up to a reinterpretation of Being, according to which Being is an inexhaustible 
creation of infinite qualities and quantities of lifeforms. This reinterpretation reflects 
Castoriadis' own thought, in which it becomes quite clear that Being is neither a 
system nor a superset of sets. That is to say, Being is not fully determined, as 
presupposed by set theory. The ensidic dimension is dense all over Being, but it is 
neither single nor continuous; at least nor in the sense of the determinacy principle. 
Being is basically Chaos or Abyss: “Chaos with irregular stratification: meaning that it 
includes partial «organizations», specific each time for the various strata we discover 
(discover / establish, discover / create) within Being”3. Being is a multidimensional 
reality, one stratified multiplicity with specialized “organizations”, wherein unfolds the 
indeterminate creation of forms other than the already existent. This otherness is neither 
a scientific discovery nor a technological innovation based on a single universal logic 
strictly written in the language of mathematics. The language of nature might be 
composed of mathematics, but nature is not merely mathematics. Mathematics is one 
crucial dimension of nature, reflecting nature’s various stratification levels. For 
Castoriadis yet, we need a different Logic from that of ensidic Logic; a Logic being 
1 Castoriadis C., The Castoriadis Reader, translated and edited by David Ames Curtis, Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd, UK, USA, 1997, pp. 307- 308. 
2 Castoriadis C., Ce qui fait la Grèce, Tome 1. D'Homère à Héraclite. Séminaires 1982-1983, Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, 2004. 
3 Castoriadis C., ‘L’ imaginaire: la création dans le domaine social-historique’, Domaines de l’ homme, 
Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1986, p. 272, translation is mine. 
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compatible with the different levels of nature, from microcosm to macrocosm. As 
Castoriadis claims: 
We can construe what is as a set only because what is is capable of being 
construed; we can categorize it only because it is categorizable. However, any 
ensemblizing, and categorizing, any organization that we establish / discover 
there proves sooner or later to be partial, lacunary, fragmentary, insufficient ‒ 
and even, more importantly, intrinsically deficient, problematic and finally 
incoherent4. 
Every organization we establish/discover within Being constitutes, to some extent, 
a recreation, which breaches the determinacy principle of set theory, insofar as it 
pertains to determinations of forms and laws other than the already existent. The 
determinacy principle, that is to say the subordination of Being to definitive categories, 
is breached by reality itself, insofar as Being is both subordinated to sets and lacunary, 
organisable and chaotic, determinate and indeterminate. But what is the key feature of 
this indeterminate determinacy attached to the concept of creation per se?  What is 
this otherness of creation? 
CREATION EX NIHILO 
Before we define the concept of creation in positive terms, it is necessary to mention 
that the indeterminacy of Being refers neither to the notion of disordered nor 
organized chaos. Indeterminacy does not refer to randomness, as considered both in 
terms of probability and chaos theory5. Castoriadis’ concept of indeterminacy does not 
correspond with the notion of probability, since probability itself is calculable and, 
therefore, determinable. In chaos theory, probability is further disguised into the 
determinacy principle under the metaphysical guise of universal unity. However, the 
unity of Being is but fragmented and stratificated. “Insofar as the ensidic dimension 
alone goes, we could talk of the unity of Being. But this unity is of course only partial 
and, for the most part, inessential”6. The “essence” of Being is rather not unity, but 
plurality, unfolding on the basis of indeterminacy of creation. The indeterminacy of 
creation transcends the field of possibility and of subsequent randomness, despite the 
fact that there is one and only passage in all Castoriadis’ work, in which he seems to 
vacillate. 
4 Castoriadis C., The Imaginary Institution of Society, Polity Press, UK, 1987, p. 273. 
5 Castoriadis C., ‘Pseudochaos, Chaos and World’, Anthropology, Politics, Philosophy, Ipselon/books, Athens, 
2001, pp. 115-116, (In Greek). 
6 Castoriadis C., ‘Time and Creation’, World in Fragments, Stanford University Press, California, 1997, p. 
401. 
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Indeterminacy (If it does not simply signify our ‘state of ignorance’ or a ‘statistical 
situation’) has a precise meaning: No state of Being is such that renders 
impossible the emergence of other determinations than those already existing7. 
The quotation marks in the passage above indicate Castoriadis’ usual irony or 
doubt. Considering though all Castoriadis’ references to the notion of indeterminacy 
in the rest of his work, the possibility of Castoriadis being doubtful or ambivalent is 
ostensible. Despite the fact that Castoriadis seems to leave open in the passage above, 
even ironically, the possibility of the notion of indeterminacy being a ‘state of 
ignorance’ or a ‘statistical situation’, Castoriadis’ overall approach to the notion of 
indeterminacy is differentiated both from probability theory and from a temporary 
scientific ignorance that will be probably replaced in the future by a definitive scientific 
knowledge. 
 Castoriadis questions repeatedly the prospect of a definitive scientific discovery, as 
developed, for instance, in both set theory and probability theory, and in the 
application of the latter to chaos theory. He doubts the prospect of discovering a 
scientific theory, which will reduce all observational phenomena to the base of some 
eternal or probabilistic equations and laws. Moreover, Castoriadis points out quite 
emphatically that modern science produces more enigmas than solutions: “Solving a 
problem implies always the creation of other problems, every Lernaean Hydras’ 
severed head makes many germinate, while our ultimate questions do not diminish as 
time goes by. Theories follow one another; the success of every one contains the seed 
of its own death.”8 Therefore, for Castoriadis, the possibility of indeterminacy 
meaning a temporary ‘state of ignorance’ or a ‘statistical situation’ is just ostensible. 
Indeterminacy does not fit the pattern of ensidic Logic, as implemented in set theory 
or chaos theory. Indeterminacy doesn’t signify the temporarily unknown or possible. 
On the contrary, for Castoriadis, indeterminacy refers to the creation of novel and, 
at the same time, other forms, laws or determinations. Indeterminacy resides in creation 
and vice versa. We thereby return to our initial question: Where does the 
indeterminacy of creation lie in? What is the otherness of creation? Castoriadis holds 
that the creation of the novel does not apply to set theory or chaos theory, given that it 
breaches the determinacy principle that rules both of them, by being a creation not 
characterized by definitive or possible attributes applying to a predetermined ensemble 
of elements. In contrast to this ensidic Logic, the creation of the new comes ex nihilo. 
 
7 Castoriadis C., The Castoriadis Reader, op. cit., p. 308. 
8 Castoriadis C., Les carrefours du labyrinth, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1978, p. 192, translation is mine. 
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Being is Chaos because it is exactly creation of forms ex nihilo, but for the same 
reason Being is cosmos, that is to say organization, totality of forms, of multiple 
forms which is more or less organized as a totality. Therefore, what i m saying 
implies the existence of phenomena we could call incommensurate (I would say 
much more trivially irreducible), the fact that the strata of the totality are neither 
incommensurate and cannot be reduced to one another nor the new forms to 
those already existed (…). The radically new doesn’t mean something simply non 
predictable (…). As i said, the new is the impossibility of deduction and 
abduction, that is to say the impossibility to construe, either logically or actually, 
a given phenomenon or entity, a X, beginning from the total situation already 
existing9. 
 There are incommensurate phenomena; phenomena that cannot be reduced to 
each other; new phenomena that are neither deduced nor produced by already 
existing ones. However, the new element of those phenomena is not simply 
predictable. One drop in roulette or in dices is 100% predictable, as it enclosed in the 
ensemble of all combinations existing potentially in probability theory. In one roll of a 
dice with 6 spots on its sides there is 1 probability in 6 for spot 1 to appear. This 
probability is random or possible. Instead, the new in Castoriadis mind is a form, an 
eidos, a determination that is neither random nor possible, but comes ex nihilo. 
Being is creation, vis formandi: not creation of “matter-energy”, but creation of 
forms. For such a creation there are each time necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions. Creation as to the form, the eidos, is ex nihilo∙ but it is neither in nihilo, 
nor cum nihilo.10 
Being is creation ex nihilo, but neither in nihilo nor cum nihilo. Being is a creation into 
something and within something. Nothingness (le neant) is not the womb of Being, but 
an expression signifying the indeterminacy inherent to the creation of a new form of 
Being. In this sense, Evangelos Vantarakis is right when he holds that the expression ex 
nihilo signifies a perpetual ontological creation neither reduced to something nor 
produced by something11. It precludes nothing, but itself. Hence the cyclical character 
of a perpetual ontological creation mentioned by Fabio Ciaramelli12, meaning that 
Being is precondition of itself. Being is itself, and for itself (pour soi), meaning a 
9 Castoriadis C., ‘Pseudochaos, Chaos and World’, Anthropology, Politics, Philosophy, Ipselon/books, Athens, 
2001, pp. 123-125, (In Greek), translation is mine. 
10 Castoriadis C., ‘Complexité, magmas, histoire’, Fait et à faire, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1997, pp. 253-254, 
translation is mine. 
11 Vantarakis E., ‘A Philosophy of Creation’, Psyche, Reason, Polis, Homage to Cornelius Castoriadis, 
Ipselon/books, Athens, 2007, p. 83, (In Greek). 
12 Ciaramelli F., ‘La circle de la création’, Autonomie et autotransformation de la société: la philosophie militante de 
Cornelius Castoriadis, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1989, pp. 87-88. 
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perpetual ontological creation without a beginning or an end. Vantarakis yet vacillates 
when he attempts to approach this ontological creation ex nihilo through the classical 
prism of origin or negativity. 
CREATION AS OTHERNESS 
Creation ex nihilo refers neither to Isiodos' cosmogony nor Big Bang theory. The 
inexhaustible ability of creation lies in the otherness of Being, by being an indeterminate 
creation of a positivity, immersing within the magmatic background of an indigenous 
multiplicity. 
This creation is always creation of a multiplicity. This we just find and state; we 
can neither deduce nor produce it. This multiplicity is always deployed in two 
modes: the mode of the simply different, as difference, repetition, ensemblistic-
identitary multiplicity (for brevity: ensidic multiplicity); and the mode of the 
other, as otherness, emergence, creative, imaginary or poietic multiplicity13. 
Creation is always a creation of a multiplicity unfolding in two modes: difference and 
otherness. Every otherness is difference, but every difference is not otherness. 
Difference presupposes otherness, given that otherness implies difference. However, 
otherness surpasses difference. More specifically, multiplicity, as difference, 
corresponds to the ensidic dimension of nature, and to the concomitant logic of set 
theory, whereas multiplicity, as otherness, signifies the notion of imaginary or poietic 
alterity. “We will say that two objects are different if there is a set of determinate 
transformations (“laws”) allowing the deduction or the production of this from that. If 
there is no such set of determinate transformations, the objects are other. The 
emergence of the other is the only way to give a more than verbal meaning to the idea 
of newness, or the new as such.”14 For example, 34 and 43 are different, as they are 
produced by the set of rational numbers, and copper and clay accordingly, as they 
derive from the totality of chemical elements. Kafka’s The Trial is yet other from 
Homer’s Iliad, since art’s necessary imaginary or poietical inspiration surpasses the 
ensidic Logic. While the notion of difference refers to the rearrangement or 
reproduction of already existing things, the notion of otherness refers to the creation of 
a new form or eidos. The notion of otherness lies thereby in originality or, in 
Castoriadis' words, newness. 
There can be of course no newness – neither scientific nor artistic – without a 
minimum of determinacy. There can be no language without sounds, phonemes, 
letters, words etc. There can be no music or painting without notes and colors. Every 
single form entails an ensidic dimension one way or another. However, the ensidic 
13 Castoriadis C., ‘Time and Creation’, World in Fragments, op. cit., p. 375. 
14 Ibid., p. 392. 
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dimension or, in other words, the ensidic mathematics is just the necessary, but not the 
sufficient condition for the creation of multiplicity as otherness. 
Otherness refers to the form of an imaginary or poietical alterity. Otherness, as 
alterity, is not the unfolding of some “initial” scientific conditions, and the subsequent 
creation of ‘matter-energy”, but the emergence of novelty or, otherwise, of originality. 
The novel in turn is not reduced to any necessary and sufficient causes; it is not thus a 
necessary result of a predetermined cause, as it is presupposed either by an Aristotelian 
deductive logic or a Hegelian determinate negation. It is not another link on a 
causative chain; it is not ruled by a deductive causality or negation. «Otherness is 
irreducible, indeducible, and not producible»15. The novel is created of course in 
relation to necessary conditions ‒ it is not created whatsoever. But it transcends 
simultaneously necessity by being the surplus element of an original form. The novel 
emerges on the basis of the old, but the old enters the novel in terms of the novel16. 
For example, Einstein’s relativity theory is necessarily based on Newton’s classical 
mechanics. But, at the same time, it transcends classical mechanics by being a novel 
theory explaining an extended range of phenomena. In another plane, Dali’s and 
Kandinski’s painting or modern jazz reproduce past painting and jazz, but they do not 
copy already given forms. On the contrary, they constitute creations, whose surplus 
element lies in an indeterminate originality. We can of course describe necessary 
causes or conditions, and outline common “shadings”. We can define relevant 
determinations due to common places, but we cannot develop a sufficient or thorough 
justification of the original eidos in question. Relativity theory is not causally deducted 
by classical mechanics. Similarly, surrealism and abstract art exist only as intrinsic 
potentialities “inside” naturalism or realism.   
Thus, for Castoriadis, there is no causality in the strict sense of the term, meaning 
a fact reducible to necessary and sufficient conditions. In the strict sense of causality, as 
develops already in Aristotle, a fact is fully justified when both the necessary and the 
sufficient conditions are determined. For instance, if we want to fully justify the natural 
phenomenon of rain, is not enough to define the clouds as the necessary conditions. 
We need also to define the sufficient conditions, that is, clouds’ electrical charges etc. 
Yet, for Castoriadis, the notion of causality means the leaning of creation on 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions. The notion of creation is not depended on 
Typical Logic’s necessary and sufficient terms, as it happens, for example, in the 
scientific explanation of rain. Creation is not like rain, a recurrent natural 
phenomenon, defined by necessary and sufficient terms, as explained by meteorology. 
15 Ibid, p. 395. 
16 Castoriadis C., A Society Adrift, Fordham University Press, New York, 2010, p. 54. 
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Creation refers to the otherness of a novel form, leaning necessarily on preceding 
terms, but not fully predetermined by them, as it happens with the natural 
phenomenon of rain. In other words, there are no sufficient grounds for a thorough 
explanation of creation. What we can provide instead is an elucidation, that is, the 
creation of adequate philosophical significations, permitting us to consider Being in its 
relation to our experience. Accordingly, we cannot fully explain why Einstein invented 
relativity theory or why Kafka wrote The Trial. Each invention is a creation that 
transcends the sheer necessity of ensidic Logic, since it exits the context of Aristotelian 
deduction or Hegelian dialectic negativity. The nothingness of such a creation is not a 
contradiction or a determinate negation, but the indeterminate otherness embedded in 
a novel form, eidos. Each novel form does not derive from a contradiction or 
deduction. Instead, nothingness is an expression signifying the creation of a new form 
of Being. Though paradoxical it may seems, a new form “contains” nothingness as the 
indeterminate part of otherness. Nothingness is embedded in Being by being the 
indeterminate part of otherness that transcends the determinacy of ensidic Logic. 
Finally, nothingness is the sheer otherness of creation, the sheer positivity of creation in 
the form of an indeterminate determinacy. 
TIME AND BEING 
In Castoriadis’ thought, the notion of creation opposes Parmenidis’ position “nothing 
comes from nothing” in a sense that signifies the indeterminate passage from a form of 
Being not already existent to a form of Being that will exist. In this sense, 
indeterminacy is furthermore connected with the notion of temporal otherness as long 
as Being is temporal. 
Time is being insofar as being is otherness, creation and destruction (…). Time is 
creation and destruction – that means, time is being in its substantive 
determinations17. 
The resemblance of Castoriadis’ notion of time with that of Bergson is more than 
obvious. For Bergson, time is juxtaposed to duration. More specifically, Bergson rejects 
the Kantian a priori conception of time on the grounds of his apprehension of Kantian 
time as subjected to mathematics and physics laws and, thus, analogous to space. In 
contrast to the quantitative and homogeneous time of mathematics and physics, 
Bergson conceives real time as a qualitative and heterogeneous duration unfolding as a 
continuous creation of novelty that consists in the indeterminacy of otherness18. 
Indeterminacy and creation characterize duration in a sense that there is no 
17 Castoriadis C., ‘Time and Creation’, op. cit., p. 395 and p. 399. 
18 Bergson H., L’ évolution créatrice, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1969, pp. 1-11. 
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mechanistic causation between the past and the present. The present, though integral 
to the past, “escapes” the past through a qualitative incommensurability between itself 
and the past19. In this sense, the notions of indeterminacy and creation in the thought 
of Bergson are strikingly similar, if not identical, to Castoriadis' ones. However, as I 
shall demonstrate in the following, not only are the similarities striking, but the 
differences as well. 
Castoriadis claims that, despite the fact that Bergson criticized the philosophical 
and scientific notion of time as approached in terms of a disguished space, he accepted 
the quantitative character of space itself. Castoriadis argues that, while this holds true 
for the ensidic or mathematical space, as approached by physics in terms of a four 
dimensional space-time, this by no means certifies that real space − meaning the space 
we live in as well as the cosmic space itself − is reduced to the abstract mathematical 
space20. It is by no means certified that real space is measurable, and thus quantitative, 
as considered in terms of positive sciences. For Castoriadis, there is an ensidic space-
time − as considered in terms of a four dimensional space-time, including all its 
paradoxes and enigmas21− inherent to an imaginary-poeitic space-time, consisting in 
otherness. Otherness is expressed through the imaginary-poeitic space-time, as the latter 
unfolds in the creation-destruction of new forms of Being. The creation of a new form 
implies the destruction of another form as long as the destruction of a form signifies 
the alteration of one form by/into another22. Whereas otherness appears also in space, 
there is no pure and abstract space of otherness. Otherness is an essential characteristic 
of imaginary-poeitic time per se, whereas space is just a necessary concomitant (forma 
accidentalis) of time23. 
19 Capec M., Bergson and Modern Physics, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971, pp. 191-192. 
20 Castoriadis C., ‘Time and Creation’, World in Fragments, op. cit., pp. 391-392. 
21The paradoxes and enigmas of a four dimensional space-time, as conceived by physics and 
mathematics, consist in the fact that, whereas space is considered reversible, time is considered 
irreversible. Time obeys the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy, according to which time 
cannot follow an irreversible direction. Castoriadis yet claims that it is by no means certain that all 
movements in space are reversible, as space movements near a black hole are influenced by gravity to 
such an extent that they cannot follow reversible directions. In addition, both the reversibility of space and 
the irreversibility of time become enigmas in the context of cosmology, in which, according to the redshift 
of the light of distant galaxies, there are directions in the universe that are irreversible, whereas, on the 
contrary, one “contraction” phase of the universe permits theoretically the reversibility of time. The 
situation becomes more complicated in the context of the theory of general relativity, in which the 
“measure” of time depends on the whole time-space structure of the universe, which depends in its turn 
on the “content” of the universe in terms of matter and energy – let alone the quantum phenomena. Ibid., 
p. 390. 
22Ibid., pp. 396-401. 
23Ibid., pp. 394-395. 
                                                          
 VANGELOS PAPADIMITROPOULOS 265 
The correlation of otherness and, by extension, of creation with imagination 
differentiates radically Castoriadis' notion of time from that of Bergson. Whereas, in 
Bergson, imagination is a function attached to memory (mémoire imaginative)24, in 
Castoriadis, imagination is a crucial element of creation per se. In Castoriadis’ 
ontology, Being is divided into three intertwined strata: the physis, the psyche and the 
anonymous collective of society25. Physis is divided into the non-living being (inorganic 
physis) analyzed through the ensidic logic of the positive sciences, and the living being 
that is magmatic inasmuch as it is characterized by three additional attributes: 
intentionality (l’ intention), affect (l’ affect) and representation (la représentation). 
While it is no place here to analyze in full detail these attributes, suffice it to say that 
the intentionality of the living being refers to the notion of pour soi of continental 
philosophy, meaning in terms of the positive sciences the notion of the biological 
autonomy as conceived by Francesco Varela26. Castoriadis builds on the notion of the 
biological autonomy of Varela to demonstrate that the biological autonomy of the 
living being consists in an intentionality evolving on the basis of the affect of pleasure 
(plaisir) and displeasure (déplaisir) into representation, the basic characteristic of which is 
the elementary imaginary (élémentaire imaginaire)27.  
The elementary imaginary of the representation of the living being as the latter 
reflects in the biodiversity of flora and fauna of nature (physis) evolves in its turn into 
the radical imaginary of the psyche and  the social imaginary of society28. The radical 
imaginary of the psyche emerges biologically through the hyper-development of the 
central nervous system, which accompanies the autonomization of the affect of 
pleasure. The autonomization of the affect of pleasure consists in the domination of 
representational pleasure over sexual pleasure and the concomitant biological-organic 
defunctionalization of pleasure. Pleasure no more derives only from the biological 
functionality of organic self-preservation and the reproduction of the living being. 
Pleasure evolves itself into the free representational / affective / intentional flux of the 
24Bergson H.,  Matière et mémoire : Essai sur la relation du corps à l' esprit, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, p. 64. 
25 Castoriadis C., The Imaginary Institution of Society, op. cit., pp. 229-237. 
26In 1979, Frascesco Varela, in cooperation with his teacher and colleague Humberto Maturana, 
introduced the notion of biological autonomy, which is somewhat differentiated from a genetic teleonomy 
of species. The notion of the biological autonomy consists in the view that every species of flora and fauna 
filters with its senses inorganic matter in a way that creates a single sensorial and cognitive closure. Every 
living being “discerns” in its environment between “noise” and useful “information” for the purpose of 
self-preservation and sexual reproduction. This “discernment” is what makes for the biological autonomy 
of each single living being. Varela F., Principles of Biological Autonomy, North Holland, New York and 
Oxford, 1979. 
27Castoriadis C., ‘Imagination, imaginaire, réflexion’ in Fait et à faire, op. cit., p. 312. 
28 Ibid., pp. 294-336. 
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psyche, which, as free, is not reduced to the mechanistic causality of the ensidic 
dimension of physis. Whereas psyche leans necessarily on the ensidic dimension of 
physis, it transcends ensidic logic as it evolves furthermore into the magma of the 
social imaginary. The free representational / affective / intentional flux of the psyche 
evolves through the creation of language and technique into the magma of the 
imaginary significations of the anonymous collective of society. Pleasure reflects 
thereafter in the creation of the imaginary significations of society as the latter are 
crystallized in religion, art, politics, science, technology and in human civilization in 
general. The non-mechanistic reproduction of pleasure is the essential “motive” of 
imagination, which is therefore the key point of the ontological creation of otherness 
evolving from the living being of physis into psyche and society. In this sense, 
imagination is not just a secondary function serving memory, but an essential element 
of ontological creation per se. 
In this ontological context, not only evolves the imaginary or poietic time into the 
“self-time” of each living being as a “subjective” instance of otherness, but also into the 
interaction of this “subjective self-time” with the imaginary significations of the 
anonymous collective. Not only possess different individuals and societies different 
times in terms of ensidic space-time as analyzed by the positive sciences, but can also 
co-formulate different imaginary conceptions of time. There is a private time and a 
public time, the time of unconscious and the time of consciousness, the time of 
reincarnation and the time of Second Advent, the time of buddism and the time of 
capitalism and so on29. Whereas every conception of time leans necessarily on an 
ensidic space-time as analyzed by the positive sciences, different societies can 
formulate different conceptions of time according to the different imaginary 
significations a society formulates given a certain historical period. And this social-
historical element influences radically both the ensidic and the imaginary-poeitic 
space-time as long as the ensidic space-time is just the necessary medium of imaginary-
poeitic space-time, as conceived by different individuals and societies in different 
historical periods. 
Finally, Castoriadis’ ontology constitutes a radical conception of Being as an 
indeterminate self-creation developing in the mode of temporal otherness. Being is 
temporal and time is otherness unfolding as radical and social imaginary throughout 
the different, but intertwined strata of physis, psyche and society. And this is, in my 
view, one of the greatest contributions of Castoriadis in contemporaneous thought that 
remains still undiscovered by the literature: the identification of time with the 
otherness expressed through the affect of the imaginary of psyche and society. In 
29 Castoriadis C., ‘Time and Creation’, World in Fragments, op. cit., pp.385-387. 
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Castoriadis, time is the affect of psyche and society as expressed through the radical 
and social imaginary, which “blends” with ensidic space-time. Time rules the 
“communion” of the physis, the psyche and the society on the basis of the otherness of 
the affect of the imaginary.  
CONCLUSION 
Castoriadis conceives Being as Chaos consisting of two essential characteristics: 
indeterminacy and creation. The notions of indeterminacy and creation contradict the 
ensemblistic-identitary logic of mathematics set theory insofar as they transcend the 
philosophical and scientific goal of attributing determinate properties to determinate 
ensembles of elements or objects. For Castoriadis, Being is divided into two modes of 
multiplicity: difference and otherness. While difference refers to the ensidic dimension 
of Being as examined by mathematics and physics, otherness refers to the creation ex 
nihilo, which is characterized by an inherent indeterminacy. The indeterminacy of 
creation ex nihilo signifies the originality attached to a novel form of Being; the fact thus 
that a novel form of Being, as expressed in art or science or even in everyday life, is 
irreducible, indeducible, and not producible. Being is creation ex nihilo, but neither in 
nihilo nor cum nihilo. Being is a creation into something and within something. In this 
sense, we cannot fully explain this sort of creation on the basis of a mechanistic 
causality. What we can do instead is to elucidate reality, that is, to create philosophical 
significations that will permit us to think of Being in its relation to our experience. 
Castoriadis’ conception of Being is further connected with time as long as Being is 
temporal and time is otherness. Otherness is an essential characteristic of time and, by 
extension, of Being itself in a sense that it transcends the ensidic dimension of time, as 
examined by mathematics and physics, by signifying the imaginary or poietic time. 
Imaginary or poietic time leans on the ensidic dimension of physis or, in other words, 
in the cosmic or natural time, but it transcends ensidic logic as long as it develops in 
the radical imaginary of the psyche, which evolves in its turn into the imaginary 
significations of society emerging in the historical context of mankind. In this sense, 
different societies form different imaginary significations based on Being’s two radical 
characteristics: indeterminacy and creation. 
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